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I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence is a serious societal problem, and many civil
and criminal legal reforms to address it have been enacted in recent
decades. In some jurisdictions, one such reform has been the creation
of therapeutic domestic violence courts. This Article will address the
apparent need for, and the potential benefits of, such courts.
Part II of this Article will explore the history of state intervention
to confront domestic violence, along with some of the attitudes that
contribute to the lack of adequate enforcement of recent legislative
reforms. Part III of this Article will discuss the costs of domestic
violence and the impact of superficial court treatment in reducing
those costs. Part IV will outline the historical development,
philosophy, and potential development of therapeutic courts, and in
particular will examine the proven effectiveness of the drug court
model and the potential benefits that are unique to domestic violence
courts. Part V suggests further creation of domestic violence courts as
a means to efficiently and effectively address the problems associated
with enforcing domestic violence legislation and provide services for
families dealing with domestic abuse.
II. HISTORY OF STATE INTERVENTION
Historically, police and prosecutors declined to pursue domestic
violence cases. The refusal to arrest or prosecute in such cases
reflected the belief that domestic violence was a "private" matter or
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that wife beating was acceptable behavior.' That a wife was entitled to
the same protection from the law as her husband, including the right
not to be beaten by him, was first recognized in 1871 in Alabama.2
Even after some states adopted laws criminalizing wife battering
around the turn of the 20th century, domestic abuse cases were
generally routed into family court.3 As recently as 1968, only married
women could obtain injunctions, and violation of the injunction would
not result in criminal penalties.4 In some jurisdictions, victims had to
pay prosecutors a fee to pursue their cases.
In the 1970s, due largely to the feminist movement, the topic of
domestic violence began to move into the public consciousness and
programs such as shelters, specialized prosecution, and studies on the
incidence of domestic violence began to emerge.6 In the past twenty-
five years, domestic abuse has increasingly been recognized as criminal
behavior that should be met with arrest and prosecution. Every state
now provides for arrest for misdemeanor domestic violence, and in
more than half the states arrest is required for some domestic violence
crimes.' The federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) now
requires mandatory arrest or pro-arrest policies by state and local
governments as a condition to receive federal funding.9
Changes in the handling of domestic violence cases were
implemented in the 1980s and 1990s, including the creation of
specialized domestic violence prosecution units, the emergence of
1. Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC
L. REV. 33, 35 (2000); Linda G. Mills, Mandatory Arrest and Prosecution Policies for Domestic
Violence: A Critical Literature Review and the Case Jbr More Research to Test Victim Empowerment
Approaches, 25 CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAVIOR 306, 307 (1998); Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward
Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1285, 1288-89 (2000).
2. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1289.
3. Id. at 1290.
4. Mills, supra note 1, at 307.
5. Id. See also Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon, The Development of a Specialized
Domestic Violence Court in Vancouver, Washington: Utilizing Innovative Judicial Paradigms, 69
UMKC L. REV. 139, 139, n.2 (2000) (discussing the lack of effective legal protection for
domestic abuse victims through the late 1970s and early 1980s); Deborah Epstein, Procedural
Justice: Tempering the State's Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843
(2002) (also discussing the lack of effective legal protection for domestic abuse victims through
the late 1970s and early 1980s).
6. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1290.
7. See generally Bruce G. Taylor et al., The Effects of a Group Batterer Treatment Program:
A Randomized Experiment in Brooklyn, 18 JUSTICE Q. 171, 172 (2001) (pointing to state and
national policies promoting increased arrest and prosecution to control domestic abuse); Winick,
supra note 1, at 36.
8. John Q. La Fond & Sharon G. Portwood, Preventing Intimate Violence: Have Law and
Public Policy Failed?, 69 UMKC L. REV. 3 (2000); Epstein, supra note 5, at 1854-55.
9. Epstein, supra note 5, at 1856.
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more batterer treatment programs, and adoption of protection order
system reforms to improve emergency access and widen the options
available to victims for legal relief.1" Many reforms were based on the
theory that holding batterers criminally accountable would reduce
future violence.1 It is also possible that such legal reforms may
efficiently signal societal indignation and promote further, greater
social reforms. 2
Research indicates that the mere existence of a state intervention,
such as calling the police, may indeed be effective in reducing
battering, possibly stopping as many as one-third of batterers from
committing another assault for a period of about six months. 3 There
also appears to be a correlation between the effectiveness of arrest and
employment. 4 Interestingly, it further appears that the length of male
employment correlates negatively to the level of violence in a romantic
heterosexual relationship.'
However, police officers may prefer not to arrest. Some view
domestic abuse victims as undependable, and think that domestic
violence arrests are unproductive because they are unlikely to result in
conviction. 6 Similarly, some prosecutors are reluctant to pursue
domestic abuse cases because victims tend not to participate in the
process.' 7  Such prosecutors apparently lack training on how to
successfully prosecute a domestic violence case without the victim.
Unfortunately, their inaction reinforces negative police attitudes. 8
10. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1290-91.
11. Id. This premise has not been fully tested, and likely will not be until more time has
passed to allow for assessment. Id. at 1314-15.
12. Edna Ullmann-Margalit & Cass R. Sunstein, Inequality and Indignation (Preliminary
Draft), at 4, 28-30, (The Chicago Working Paper Series Index, John M. Olin Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 141, Preliminary Draft, 2002), available at http://papers/ssrn.com/sol3/
papers. cfm?abstractid=30110 (last visited May 1, 2004) (discussing such reforms as
"transformative law").
13. Taylor et al., supra note 7, at 174. It is not as clear that arrest is always effective.
Compare Winick, supra note 1, at 71 (asserting that the methodology of a study that found lower
recidivism among arrested batterers was flawed) and LaFond & Portwood, supra note 8, at 5
(indicating that "some data" suggests that arrest reduces battering in the short run but increases
violence in the long term).
14. See Mills, supra note 1, at 308 (indicating that arrest and prosecution may not always
deter future violence, particularly if the batterer is unemployed); Tsai, supra note 1, at 1321
n.258 (surmising that employed perpetrators face the greater social cost of losing their jobs,
compared to unemployed perpetrators).
15. Helen V. Tauchen et al., Domestic Violence: A Non-Random Affair, at 2, (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1665, 1985), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers. cfm?abstractid=227186#PaperDowload (last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
16. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1294.
17. Id.
18. Cf. id. at 1294. See also Epstein, supra note 5, at 1857 (discussing prosecutor reluctance
to pursue criminal charges in domestic violence cases).
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Legal reforms addressing domestic violence have also been
enacted in the civil justice system. Every state now has a civil
protection order statute. Most authorize such relief as emergency
procedures to obtain an order, provisions forbidding assault and
contact, temporary child custody, supervised visitation with children,
and child support.1 9 However, unenthusiastic or hostile enforcement
of such statutes by uninformed judges greatly undermines the statutes'
effectiveness.2°  Moreover, studies of the effectiveness of civil
protection orders strongly encourage courts to link victims with
services, including counseling and safety planning.21
III. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
A. Costs of Domestic Violence
It is critically important that domestic violence be efficiently and
appropriately addressed because the physical, emotional and financial
costs of domestic violence are high. Current or former intimate
partners annually assault approximately 840,000 to one million
women. 22  This statistic contributes to the fact that by 1996, about
one-quarter of the adult female population reported some sort of
physical victimization during their lifetime at the hands of a family
member or intimate partner.2 a Some studies suggest that one-third toone-half of marriages are violent. 24 A recent survey by the National
Institute of Justice reported that fifty-two percent of respondents said
they had been physically assaulted during their lives.25 Seventy-six
percent of those who reported rape or physical assault in adulthood
19. Epstein, supra note 5, at 1858-60.
20. See id. at 1861 (pointing out that some judges may refuse to issue orders or even
threaten sanctions on a return visit because they believe a victim is "refusing" to leave the
relationship, or may misinterpret behavior by victims suffering from post traumatic stress
disorder, and then express their hostility toward the victim and sympathy for the batterer by
demanding unusually high levels of proof to issue a protection order).
21. Greg Berman & Anne Gulick, Just the (Unwieldy, Hard to Gather, but Nonetheless
Essential) Facts, Ma'am: What We Know and Don't Know about Problem Solving Courts, 30
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1027, 1045 (2003).
22. Taylor et al., supra note 7, at 172 (indicating that although the number of female
victims of intimate violence declined in the 1990s, an estimated 840,000 women annually were
assaulted by their current or former partners); Winick, supra note 1, at 70. Some studies indicate
that as many as four million women a year undergo severe assaults at the hands of their intimate
partners. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1291, 1292.
23. Taylor et al., supra note 7, at 172.
24. Robert A. Pollak, An Intergenerational Model of Domestic Violence, at 3, (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9099, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers .cfm?abstract id=324042 (last visited May 1, 2004).
25. LaFond & Portwood, supra note 8, at 4.
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indicated that a current or former intimate partner had perpetrated the
assault.26
Domestic violence also requires considerable use of societal
resources, including public services such as police, fire, schools and
the criminal justice system. In one jurisdiction, approximately one-
third of the emergency calls were related to partner abuse.27 School
staff members in the same jurisdiction estimated that one-quarter to
one-third of students live with family violence.28 Additionally, more
than one-third of criminal case filings in the same jurisdiction in a
five-month period concerned domestic violence.29
Battering is a type of domestic violence that has particularly
costly consequences. Battering is ongoing behavior within a
relationship which victimizes the intimate partner repeatedly. 30
Physical abuse results in serious injury. Battering is thought to
account for one-fifth to one-half of all female emergency room
patients. 31 Battering may also account for as much as twenty-eight
percent of all violence perpetrated against women.32 It is the leading
cause of injury to women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four.33
Moreover, domestic violence victims can develop serious
psychological injuries and mental illness as a result of repeated abuse.34
Spousal abuse is also a major contributing factor to child abuse and
neglect, female alcoholism, drug abuse, homelessness, and attempted
suicide.3' The clear implication of these figures is an enormous drain
on American productivity due to battering of the female workforce.
Moreover, domestic abuse is often lethal. It is estimated that an
average of four to five women die daily in the United States as a result
of battering.36 Approximately one-third of all female homicides are
26. Id.




30. Winick, supra note 1, at 37-38.
31. Id. at 70.
32. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1292.
33. Mills, supra note 1, at 306.
34. Winick, supra note 1, at 39, 62; Amy E. Street et al., The Associations Among Male-
Perpetrated Partner Violence, Wives' Psychological Distress and Children's Behavior Problems: A
Structural Equation Modeling Analysis, 34 J. OF COMP. FAM. STUD. 23, 24 (2003); see Rita
Thaemert, Till Violence Do Us Part, 19 STATE LEGISLATURES 26 (1993).
35. Thaemert, supra note 34, at 26.
36. Linda K. Meier & Brian K. Zoeller, Taking Abusers to Court: Civil Remedies for
Domestic Violence Victims, 30 TRIAL 60 (1995).
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attributed to domestic violence.37 Departure from the relationship is
not safe: women who leave the batterer are at a seventy-five percent
greater risk of being killed by the batterer than those who stay.3"
Battering also takes a serious toll on children, including those still
in the womb. Fifteen to twenty-five percent of pregnant women are
battered.39 Prenatal battering has been listed as the leading cause of
birth defects and infant mortality.4"
Domestic violence exacts large costs when witnessed by children,
and child witnessing of battering is common. More than half of
domestic violence victims live in homes with children who are younger
than twelve years old.4 Disturbingly, at least one study suggests that
relationships tend to be more violent if the couple has parented
multiple children together.42
An estimated 3.3 million children annually witness domestic
violence incidents.43 Such children may grow up to become domestic
violence victims, and are ten times more likely than other children to
engage in domestic violence as adults.44  Children who observe
domestic violence experience psychological damage and problems in
school.4" Children's exposure to domestic violence also correlates with
an increased risk that they will subsequently attempt suicide.46
B. Superficial Court Treatment and its Impact
Although current laws reflect recognition that domestic violence
is a serious and a criminal matter, court handling of the actual cases
may not. In some jurisdictions, large numbers of domestic abuse cases
can overwhelm the court docket and result in cursory judicial
treatment. 47
37. Mills, supra note 1, at 306; cf. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1293 (reporting that "31% of
homicides in which the victim and perpetrator knew each other involved women killed by their
partners").
38. Thaemert, supra note 34, at 26.
39. Id.
40. Meier & Zoeller, supra note 36, at 60 (citing March of Dimes study).
41. Winick, supra note 1, at 65.
42. Tauchen et al., supra note 15, at 22.
43. Winick, supra note 1, at 65; Street et al., supra note 34, at 24.
44. Winick, supra note 1, at 65.
45. Id. at 65-66; Street et al., supra note 34, at 24. Street et al., point out that these
maternal stresses and mental health problems in turn apparently make battered mothers poorer
parents, resulting in child behavioral problems. Id. at 24-25, 33-36.
46. Winick, supra note 1, at 65-66. The Massachusetts Department of Youth Services
reports that such children are six times more likely to attempt suicide, twenty-four percent more
likely to commit sexual assaults, seventy-four percent more likely to commit personal crimes, and
fifty percent more likely to engage in substance abuse. Sarah M. Buel, Domestic Violence and the
Law: An Impassioned Exploration for Family Peace, 33 FAM. L. Q. 719, 734 n.51 (1999).
47. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1293.
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Opportunity costs of such superficial court treatment can be
high. Victims referred to a large, urban criminal court may never
learn about resources such as shelters, long-term housing, counseling
and employment opportunities. Perpetrators may not be held
accountable or monitored for compliance with court conditions.48
This treatment may reinforce both police bias against arrest in
domestic violence cases and reluctance of prosecutors who lack
specialized skills in this area to bring batterers to court.49  The end
result, as one commentator points out, is "legal condonation of family
violence.""0 Moreover, victims who have observed domestic violence
cases fail to receive high priority for competitive judicial system
resources have been reluctant to seek relief from the court system. 51
In the community, failure to coordinate the various groups
addressing domestic violence also results in wasted resources. Such
lack of coordination means that courts, victim advocacy groups, social
service agencies, and the medical community deal with domestic abuse
in a fragmented and haphazard manner.5 2
IV. THERAPEUTIC COURTS AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
An arguably more productive approach to domestic violence
stems from the creation of domestic violence courts.5 3 There are now
more than two hundred domestic violence courts.54 Such courts are
just one example of a recent and dramatic change in the way courts
approach criminal justice issues.
Traditionally, courts have acted as a governmental mechanism to
resolve disputes, including disputes revolving around government
accusations of criminal wrongdoing. The role of judges is to serve as
neutral arbiters who determine the facts in a case or supervise juries
engaging in a fact-finding process.55
48. Id. at 1293-94.
49. See id. at 1294.
50. Id. Such legal tolerance seems especially inappropriate because of the serious
consequences of domestic violence. It would seem more appropriate to devote resources to
reduction of the incidence of domestic abuse. See Fritzler & Simon, supra note 5, at 146-47.
51. See Fritzler & Simon, supra note 5, at 143.
52. Id. at 142 (quoting local newspaper referring to spousal abuse "system" as "more of a
hasty compilation of bad habits, like a haphazard patch job on a roof not built for rain").
53. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1296-97 n.91 (noting that San Diego, California, and Quincy,
Massachusetts, along with New York, Connecticut, Maryland, Florida and Tennessee are among
the jurisdictions that have begun to implement domestic violence courts).
54. Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 1055, 1058 (2003).
55. Winick, supra note 54, at 1055.
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A. The Problem Solving Approach
The traditional role of courts has changed within the past fifteen
years, with the increasing realization that criminal behavior is
frequently linked to other issues, such as substance abuse, mental
health problems, and family problems. In an effort to deal with these
issues, many judges have moved toward assuming a role beyond
adjudication. The aim is "problem solving" through therapeutic
intervention and ongoing court review. Among the types of "specialty
courts" that have emerged as a result are drug and alcohol courts,
mental health courts, and family courts, along with domestic violence
courts. 56
Problem-solving courts typically focus on a defined population of
offenders and use the court process in non-traditional ways to
motivate behavior changes through treatment.5 7 Such courts recognize
that it is pointless and an inefficient use of resources to simply send
addicts, the mentally ill, and others with ongoing behavioral issues
through a revolving door of incarceration and release. 8 Because of
their rejection of this approach and focus on monitored treatment,
problem-solving courts are often referred to as therapeutic courts.
5 9
Unlike traditional courts, which focus on adjudicating and
determining the facts in a case, therapeutic courts also seek to
rehabilitate offenders, provide access to services, and monitor
treatment. 60
56. Janet Gilbert et al., Applying Therapeutic Principles to a Family-Focused Juvenile Justice
Model (Delinquency), 52 ALA. L. REV. 1153, 1197-98 (2001); John A. Bozza, "The Devil Made
Me Do It": Legal Implications of the New Treatment Imperative, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 55,
63 (2002); Winick, supra note 54, at 1056 (noting that the juvenile court, which began in 1899 in
Chicago to rehabilitate juvenile delinquency, was the forerunner of this approach). Other types
of therapeutic courts include reentry courts, which assist offenders released from prison in
reentry, teen courts, which allow adolescents to adjudicate each other's minor offenses, and
dependency courts, which adjudicate whether child abuse or neglect has occurred, attempt to
provide services if it has, and terminate parental rights if services are not effective. Id. at 1058-
60.
57. Gilbert et al., supra note 56, at 1198. These new approaches are the result of both local
innovation and new understandings about the impact of treatment on problems like addiction.
Michael C. Doff & Charles Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist
Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 841-42 (2000).
58. Winick, supra note 54, at 1056; Eric Lane, Due Process and Problem-Solving Courts, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955, 955-56 (2003) (quoting Chief Justice Kathleen Blatz of the Minnesota
Supreme Court, characterizing this revolving door approach as "McJustice: we sure aren't good
for you, but we are fast").
59. See Gilbert et al., supra note 56, at 1198 (noting that by determining the therapeutic
consequences of the law, therapeutic jurisprudence can assist in reducing negative results and in
enhancing positive results). However, the approach has its critics. See generally Bozza, supra
note 56.
60. See Winick, supra note 54, at 1066-67. Although therapeutic courts have arisen from
necessity, there are arguably other institutional advantages to such courts. See, e.g., Jeffrey
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Therapeutic jurisprudence began in the late 1980s, coincidentally
with the emergence of therapeutic courts. Arising originally from
mental health law, it is a scholarly, interdisciplinary movement toward
legal reform.6 This field of study aims to assess the costs and benefits
of enforcing laws by evaluating the overall consequences on
individuals in society.62 The assessment can reveal whether or not
enacted laws are accomplishing their public policy goals. Therapeutic
jurisprudence advocates also seek to incorporate knowledge of other,
non-legal disciplines into the legal system, and to consider alternative
legal outcomes such as treatment programs.63 Their aims are related
to those of therapeutic courts, and it can be said that therapeutic
courts take a therapeutic jurisprudence approach to case processing.64
In domestic violence cases, a therapeutic approach would appear
efficient, as it avoids the transaction costs exacted when separate
services to domestic violence victims are not coordinated. It also
evades the opportunity costs of expending greater resources to later
assist or heal victims who could have been helped more cheaply
earlier, if alerted to appropriate services.65
In fact, an even broader argument can be made that when a
system relies on increasing coercion without reducing levels of crime,
it has become inefficient. A legitimate system-that is to say, one that
is perceived to be fair, effective and rightful-is necessary to induce
order and stability. A legitimate system is hence cost effective and
efficient in the long run.66 Thus, to the extent that domestic violence
courts and other therapeutic courts increase legitimacy, they produce
greater efficiency.
Significant economic forces support the rise in the general use of
therapeutic courts. Imprisonment is expensive. Starting in 1986,
Fagan & Victoria Malkin, Theorizing Community Justice Through Community Courts, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897, 897-98, 902-03 (2003). Courts have the convening power to coerce
various actors to come together, the reputation of neutrality that allows them to function as
honest brokers, the prestige to command respect, and the ability to declare a course of conduct to
be unlawful. Id. at 898. See also Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 945-46 (2003).
61. Winick, supra note 54, at 1062-63.
62. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1295.
63. Id. at 1295-96; see also Philip D. Gould & Patricia H. Murrell, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Cognitive Complexity: An Overview, 29 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 2117, 2120-22
(2002).
64. See generally Winick, supra note 54, at 1064-66 (noting that therapeutic jurisprudence
utilizes insights from psychology and behavioral sciences to critique legal and judicial practices.
It is an approach aimed at integrating treatment services with judicial case processing; providing
ongoing judicial intervention; and facilitating collaboration with community-based and
governmental organizations).
65. See Tsai, supra note 1, at 1316-18.
66. See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 60, at 903-05.
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spending to build new correctional institutions increased by more than
fifty percent, and has remained at all time high levels, The number
of imprisoned persons doubled between 1985 and 1999 to 1.8
million. 8 The amount expended on correctional institutions rose from
about four billion dollars in 1980 to over twenty-five billion dollars in
1996.69 The annual cost of incarceration ballooned by more than 600
percent between 1980 and 1997.70
B. Successful Therapeutic Court Models:
Drug Courts and Mental Health Courts
Drug courts are one of the most significant and early examples of
therapeutic jurisprudence. They are clearly, in part, a response to the
skyrocketing rates of incarceration of offenders on drug-related
offenses, the relative ineffectiveness of substance abuse treatment
through the prison system, and the high recidivism rate among drug
offenders.7 They are also a response to the fact that annual state and
local expenditures on drug law enforcement have risen from some 10
billion dollars in the mid 1980's to 35 billion dollars in 2001.72
There are now more than 785 operating drug courts, and more
than 450 more are in the planning stage in the United States." They
are in operation in all fifty states, and are supported by authorizing
legislation in thirty-two states. 74 Such courts have attracted over 125
67. Bozza, supra note 56, at 61.
68. Id.
69. Id. Crime rates have declined as well since 1991. Id. The overall crime rate remains,
however, some eighty percent higher than it was in 1965. Id. at 71.
70. Id. at 71. In Connecticut, incarceration is estimated to cost the state $25,000 per year,
per offender. This figure excludes fixed costs such as debt service and depreciation. Fred V.
Carstensen et al., A Dynamic Economic Impact Analysis of Alternatives to Incarceration in
Connecticut as Proposed by SB 1083 and SB 1428, at 2, (Connecticut Ctr. for Econ. Analysis,
2001), available at http://ccea.uconn.edu/studies/Incarceration%20_Analysis.pdf (last visited:
May 1, 2004).
71. Lisa Strauss, U.S. Drug Court: A Building Block for Canada, 8 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 685, 688-90 (2002); Lisa Rosenblum, Mandating Effective Treatment for Drug Offenders, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 1217, 1220, 1230-32 (2002); Douglas B. Marlowe et al., Amenability to Treatment
of Drug Offenders, 67-SEP FED. PROBATION 40 (Sept. 2003) (observing that more than two-
thirds of drug offenders are re-arrested within three years of release, and it is estimated that as
many as 95% return to drug use within that time).
72. Drug Policy in America-A Continuing Debate: Report of the Task Force on the Use of
Criminal Sanctions to the King County Bar Association Board of Trustees, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
499, 502, 530 (2003) [hereinafter Report of the Task Force].
73. Id. at 555.
74. Id. at 555-56; Bozza, supra note 56, at 63; See also LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the
Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally
Ill Offenders, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 373, 398 (2000); see also Winick, supra note 54, at 1057;
Strauss, supra note 71, at 686, 692.
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million dollars from the federal treasury." They appear to be cost-
effective in reducing recidivism. The completion rate is about forty-
seven percent, accompanied by lower re-arrest rates. 6 Some drug
courts have found that eighty-five to ninety percent of participants
remained arrest-free.7  Recent research indicates that reduced
recidivism correlates primarily with greater participation in drug
treatment services, and cautions that drug courts may not always be
successful in providing needed access to treatment services. 78
Nonetheless, they seem to provide more comprehensive supervision
and monitoring than any other community-based form of oversight. 9
Similarly, preliminary results indicate that mental health courts
are more effective in reducing criminal recidivism among offenders.8"
The key appears to be that therapeutic courts are more likely to cause
offenders, who are coerced or mandated into treatment, to complete
it.81
75. Report of the Task Force, supra note 72, at 555-56; Strauss, supra note 71, at 692; Bozza,
supra note 56, at 63; see also Alternatives to Incarceration for Drug-Abusing Offenders, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 1898, 1916 (1998) (quoting estimate by United States General Accounting Office that
since 1989 over $125 million has been provided to plan and develop drug courts) [hereinafter
Alternatives to Incarceration].
76. Bozza, supra note 56, at 64 n.45. Drug court completion rates are comparable to or
greater than typical outpatient drug treatment program results. Faye S. Taxman & Jeffrey A.
Bouffard, Drug Treatment in the Community-A Case Study of System Integration Issues, 57 FED.
PROBATION 4, 4-5 (Sept. 2003).
77. Kondo, supra note 74, at 435-36; see also Daniel T. Eismann, Drug Courts: Changing
People's Lives, 46 ADVOC. (Idaho) 16, 17-18 (Sept. 2003) (drug court participants, when
compared to non-participants, showed lower recidivism rates and re-arrest: 38% compared to
63%, and 18% compared to 42%, respectively); Rosenblum, supra note 71, at 1226-27 (asserting
that recidivism among drug court participants ranges between 5% and 28%, and less than 4% for
graduates); Report of the Task Force, supra note 72, at 556-57.
78. Taxman & Bouffard, supra note 76, at 4-5.
79. See Doff & Sabel, supra note 57, at 850.
80. Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 75, at 1921 (positing that "the impact of drug
use on the criminal justice system, coupled with the recent increase in the use of mandatory
sentences and sentencing guidelines, is so great that successful treatment-based programs could
have a profound effect on recidivism and overcrowding"); Teresa W. Cams et al., Therapeutic
Justice in Alaska's Courts, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2002) (noting that an evaluation for
Alaska's mental illness court indicated that participants in the program experienced fewer and
shorter mental health facility admissions, and experienced fewer arrests with shorter jail stays,
along with a marked improvement in housing situations). At least one program also reduces the
number of initial arrests and bookings, by routing mentally ill persons directly into treatment for
medical attention. Kondo, supra note 74, at 437. Other programs report high retention rates in
treatment of more than two thirds of all participants, and cost savings from moving clients from
jail to community treatment. Berman & Gulick, supra note 21, at 1036.
81. Cams et al., supra note 80, at 12; Strauss, supra note 71, at 692-94. Retention rates in
drug courts average sixty percent, compared with only thirty to sixty percent in voluntary
treatment programs. Berman & Gulick, supra note 21, at 1031. However, the intensive court
monitoring and graduated sanctions characteristic of drug courts also appear to help offenders
avoid recidivism, independently of treatment. Id. at 1032. See also Doff & Sabel, supra note 57,
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C. Other Therapeutic Court Benefits
Therapeutic courts are considerably less costly than traditional
incarceration.82 Requiring participants to pay some or most of the
treatment and monitoring costs can defray court costs further, and
may be an appropriate economic sanction for participants' criminal
behavior as well."
One critical aspect of therapeutic courts is attention to public
safety. Public safety is assured through ongoing oversight of the
offender, an effort to appropriately address minor noncompliance, and
a swift judicial response to violation of court conditions. 4 Other
significant components of a therapeutic court include protection of
due process rights, ongoing collaboration between the court and all
court participants, regular court hearings, and stressing incentives
toward positive behavior as well as accountability for misbehavior.8 5
Additional criteria for assessing such courts include their efficiency in
processing cases and consistency of decision-making in similar cases. 6
Judges in therapeutic courts are actively involved. They typically use
their authority to motivate individuals to accept services, to monitor
offender compliance and progress, and to engage in close working
relationships with community agencies, treatment providers, and other
court participants. 7
at 850 (summarizing findings that drug courts reduce drug use and criminal conduct during time
in the court and afterward).
82. Bozza, supra note 56, at 64 n.45; see also Kondo, supra note 74, at 401; Strauss, supra
note 71, at 694-95; Rosenblum, supra note 71, at 1235; Dorf& Sabel, supra note 57, at 850. It is
estimated that cost savings for drug court mandated drug treatment programs are about $5,000
per jailed inmate. In King County, Washington, it is estimated that taxpayers saved $522,000
for the first three years of drug court operation. Report of the Task Force, supra note 72, at 556
n.271. In Alaska, the cost for a felony drug court participant is estimated at $16,950 annually,
compared with $40,000 per year for incarceration. Cans et al., supra note 80, at 18 (using
statistics gathered in 2001). Drug courts across the nation have been estimated to cost $2,562 per
participant and to produce $4,691 in net benefits per participant, or $2.83 of benefits per dollar
of cost. Steve Aos et al., Comparative Costs and Benefits of Programs to Reduce Crime,
Washington State Inst. for Pub. Policy, at 3 (2001). Some studies suggest the savings in jail bed
days is as high as $5,000 per defendant or more. Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 75, at
1917; Strauss, supra note 71, at 695. In 1998 in Connecticut, various methods to avoid
incarceration of substance abusing offenders, including drug court, were estimated to have saved
the cost of 3,500 prison and jail beds, or capital costs of $525 million and $94 million per year in
operating costs. Carstensen et al., supra note 70, at 25.
83. Cams et al., supra note 80, at 18-19.
84. Gilbert et al., supra note 56, at 1204-05; Eismann, supra note 77, at 17.
85. Gilbert et al., supra note 56, at 1205-11; Eismann, supra note 77, at 17; Alternatives to
Incarceration, supra note 75, at 1914. See also Doff & Sabel, supra note 57, at 844-49 (providing
detailed overview of drug court characteristics).
86. Kondo, supra note 74, at 405.
87. Winick, supra note 54, at 1060-61.
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Notably, initial studies indicate that use of therapeutic courts
may result in long term cost savings."8 This is a result of greater
judicial efficiency and consistent decision-making, as well as smoother
coordination among judicial, criminal justice, and treatment
providers.89 In short, such courts appear to be more efficient and thus
reduce transaction costs.9"
D. Domestic Violence Courts
Like other therapeutic courts, domestic violence courts take an
integrated approach.9' Judges, prosecutors, court personnel, and other
domestic violence actors such as advocates and representatives of
community programs are brought into one court to provide a more
effective, efficient response to domestic violence cases.92 For example,
in the Quincy, Massachusetts, court, the cooperating parties include
judges, clerks, prosecutors, police, probation officers, social service
providers, and community agencies.93 In the New York court,
courtrooms are staffed by specially trained judges, prosecution teams,
and domestic violence personnel including a resource coordinator,
victim advocate, and defendant monitor.94
88. See, e.g., Kondo, supra note 74, at 434.
89. Id. (discussing merits of family courts).
90. In some courts, however, especially those that discourage plea-bargaining, more jury
trials may result. Fritzler & Simon, supra note 5, at 148. Nonetheless, therapeutic courts,
because of their stress on performance and outcome, appear overall to be the most efficient
compared to other court structures. The principles on which they rest are strikingly similar to
the court performance standards developed by the National Center for State Courts project. See
id. at 151. See Berman & Gulick, supra note 21, at 1033 (noting reduced costs of adjudication
associated with drug courts).
91. Courts differ on the level of integration. Some courts only provide for separate pretrial
domestic violence calendars, and otherwise are not integrated. Other courts integrate all non-
evidentiary court appearances before a single judge. Some courts consolidate all court
appearances in criminal domestic violence cases before a single judge. The integrated approach
is to combine all court appearances regarding a particular offender and victim, whether civil or
criminal, before a single judge or group of judges. This latter structure provides for the greatest
possible efficiency and reduction in transaction costs by coordinating all available services,
maximizing court oversight of offenders, and eliminating conflicting judicial orders. See Fritzler
& Simon, supra note 5, at 147.
92. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1287; See also Lane, supra note 58, at 980 (citing the example of
the resource coordinator position located within the courtroom of the West Jackson, Florida,
domestic violence court system). There are tensions that are inherent to this approach. An
individualized, treatment-based approach to domestic violence cases may create a perception that
these offenders are receiving more lenient treatment than others. Victim wishes disfavoring
prosecution are not always followed in a court that stresses aggressive domestic violence
prosecution. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1310-12.
93. Id. at 1298.
94. Id. at 1300-01. A similar integrated approach is taken in Clark County, Washington.
Fritzler & Simon, supra note 5, at 159-164.
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Both civil protection orders and criminal prosecutions fall under
the domestic violence court's jurisdiction, and the court may also
handle important linked matters such as divorce, child support, and
paternity.9" Additionally, the court works with and refers batterers,
victims, and their families to a variety of programs, including victim
counseling, batterer treatment, and substance abuse treatment.96 In
Dade County, Florida, the domestic violence court also provides
counseling for children who have witnessed domestic violence. 97 The
court's ability to refer victims to needed services and resources reduces
transaction costs.98
All cases involving the offender and victim are linked so that
they are not managed on a piecemeal basis.99 The judges in these
courts develop expertise in handling domestic violence issues.1°
Further, compliance with court conditions is monitored on an ongoing
basis." 1 The domestic violence court is also able to act more quickly
than a general criminal court. 2 The court can encourage offenders to
95. Winick, supra note 1, at 39-40. It is important that protection orders be enforced. As
many as thirty-four percent of victims who obtain a protection order find that the order is
violated within six months. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1291. Some studies indicate that more than
half of protection orders are violated within a year or two, and that more than seventeen percent
of domestic violence homicide victims had obtained a protection order. Id. at 1292.
96. Winick, supra note 1, at 39. For example, in the Quincy, Massachusetts court, victims
work with advocates who accompany victims to court, give emotional support and advice, and
provide information about available resources. The advocates also train police officers and track
domestic violence incidents reported by the police. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1298-99. Advocate
roles are similar in the New York City domestic violence court and the Dade County, Florida
domestic violence court. Id. at 1300-01, 1303.
97. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1304.
98. Winick, supra note 1, at 41. For example, in the District of Columbia court system, a
Domestic Violence Intake Center explains the system to the victim, assists her in filling out
paperwork, can assist with making specific issues such as child support, custody or visitation part
of the protection order remedy, and is able to refer her to counseling programs, shelters, and
other social service agencies, as well as an advocate if a criminal case is pending. Tsai, supra note
1, at 1305. See also Berman & Gulick, supra note 21, at 1047 (noting apparent significant
improvements in coordination and efficiency after formation of a specialized felony domestic
violence court in Brooklyn, New York).
99. Winick, supra note 1, at 40. In the District of Columbia Domestic Violence
Coordination Unit, a clerk searches the computer for prior or additional cases involving the same
parties and compiles a case history. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1305.
100. Winick, supra note 1, at 40. The District of Columbia domestic violence court, as is
typical for such courts, is staffed by specially trained judges who serve at least for a year before
rotating out of the court. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1305-06. Ongoing training and education of
judges and court personnel, as Tsai points out, tends to enhance application and enforcement of
domestic violence laws. Id. at 1326.
101. Winick, supra note 1, at 40. This monitoring has been characterized as the "key to the
success" of the West Jackson, Florida domestic violence court. Lane, supra note 58, at 980.
102. Winick, supra note 1, at 40. Restraining orders in the Quincy, Massachusetts court
are handled through an expedited hearings process. Defendants are monitored closely by
probation. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1298-99. In the New York City domestic violence court, the
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enter and remain in treatment by offering diversion, probation, or a
reduced sentence as an incentive." 3 In some courts, it may be possible
to assess and manage offender risk, possibly based on an actuarial
assessment. 104
A significant aspect of a domestic violence court is use of batterer
treatment programs." 5 Courts began ordering defendants into such
programs in the early 1980's. 106 By the late 1990's, batterer treatment
programs estimated that court referral accounted for nearly eighty
percent of their clients."0 7 Such programs, if successful in reducing the
likelihood of future domestic violence, are clearly cost effective in
improving public safety generally by reducing the number of future
victims.10 Because many victims stay with their abusive partners,
they may also be cost effective in reducing or eliminating future
violence toward existing victims." 9  Effective batterer treatment
programs may also have a useful "ripple effect," by increasing police
willingness to make arrests and by encouraging prosecutors to
effectively pursue cases of domestic violence."'
Although there is little reliable research on whether treating
batterers is effective, the majority of methodologically sound studies
indicate that treatment tends to reduce later violence, and some
preliminary evidence suggests that court-mandated treatment is more
effective in reducing future violence.1 ' If true, this would be a Pareto
superior transaction for each batterer and victim, by improving the
victim's situation without worsening the batterer's. 12 Interestingly, a
1992 study indicated that recidivism rates of those who are treated are
resource coordinator, defendant monitor and victim advocate work closely together and promptly
notify the judge of violations of court conditions such as protection orders, to facilitate a quick
response and imposition of sanctions. All participants in the court keep information accurate and
up to date through ongoing electronic communication. Id. at 1301-02.
103. Winick, supra note 1, at 42.
104. Id. at 50-58.
105. See Tsa, supra note 1, at 1296-97. The Dade County domestic violence court in
Florida focuses primarily on batterer treatment, which may include participation in domestic
violence, substance abuse, and mental health treatment. Id. at 1302-03.




110. Id. at 172-73.
111. Tsai, supra note 1, at 1318-19; Berman & Gulick, supra note 21, at 1042-43. Some
experienced domestic violence court participants, however, do seriously question the
effectiveness of domestic violence treatment programs, at least in a "one size fits all" format.
However, they still support such programs when combined with support programs for victims
and, when appropriate, with substance abuse treatment. Fritzler & Simon, supra note 5, at 165-
69.
112. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-14 (Aspen 2002).
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one-third of those who are not treated.113 A recently published study
of domestic violence cases handled in Kings County, New York
between 1995 and 1996 similarly indicated that batterer treatment was
effective in reducing the prevalence and frequency of recidivism, to as
much as one half of what would otherwise have been expected.'
One significant and unanswered question is the opportunity cost
of the resources expended on batterer treatment. On the one hand,
there are those who argue persuasively that these resources should go
to women's services, not to assist abusive men."' On the other hand,
if batterer treatment is effective in reducing violence, it is an
appropriate use of money to prevent the need for ongoing expenditure
for medical and ameliorative services to victims.
There is also contradictory information about the effectiveness of
legal sanctions to stop or reduce domestic violence. From the point of
view of a rational batterer, however, it would seem most likely that
awareness of a responsive court system would tend to reduce the
batterer's interest in engaging in the conduct. The greater the
certainty and level of punishment, the less likely it is that a criminal
will engage in the prohibited conduct.1 6 By contrast, less coordinated
provision of services and less reliable enforcement of court conditions
would likely tend to increase the probability of further violence." 7 It
is not surprising that studies do indeed show significant differences in
domestic abuser behavior, and increased compliance with court orders,
as a consequence of more severe sanctions."' Preliminary studies also
113. Taylor et al., supra note 7, at 175.
114. Id. at 193. But see Tsai, supra note 1, at 1313-14 (noting conflicting reports about
effectiveness of batterer treatment).
115. See Tsai, supra note 1, at 1314 (noting that battered women advocates oppose
spending money on batterer treatment programs when doing so diverts limited funds from
battered women programs).
116. See POSNER, supra note 112, at 219-20 (pointing out that there seems to be substance
to a model postulating that crimes are committed because the expected benefit of the crime
exceed the expected costs, and that in general cost will be calculated by multiplying the amount
of punishment by the probability of its imposition); see also Epstein, supra note 5, at 1966-67
(stating that mandatory arrest and aggressive prosecution policies have been asserted to correlate
with substantial positive results, including decreases in domestic homicides). The possible
downside of harsh sanctions-and a principle argument against the application of mere
deterrence theory-is that if batterers perceive themselves as being treated unfairly, their
compliance with court conditions and domestic violence laws may decrease. Id. at 1871, 1875-
83. Clearly it is vital that a therapeutic domestic violence court provide due process protections
to defendants, including a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Id. at 1895-99. It is interesting
to note that in one community court where the defendants were surveyed they commented on the
court's better facilities and faster processing time, and indicated they preferred it because
personnel in the court treated them better. Berman & Gulick, supra note 21, at 1049.
117. See Tsai, supra note 1, at 1324.
118. Id. at 1320-21 n.252. Interestingly, the certainty and severity of sanctions also appear
to be the most effective aspect of drug courts. Berman & Gulick, supra note 21, at 1032-33.
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indicate that the rigorous court monitoring that is characteristic of
domestic violence courts is effective in reducing recidivism. 119
Moreover, research indicates that improvement in a victim's
opportunities outside the relationship significantly reduce the level of
domestic violence.1 2' This reduction is partly because such
improvement makes violence a less effective means of winning
compliance: threats are less likely to induce obedience, and the"optimal level" of threatened violence for the batterer falls. Also, if
the victim's opportunities improve, it is less probable that she will
remain in the relationship. 121 These observations suggest that to the
extent therapeutic domestic violence courts can provide victims with
comprehensive access to services, they can directly increase
opportunities and reduce overall violence. 122
V. CONCLUSION
Domestic violence exacts huge economic costs because of the
physical and psychological injuries it inflicts on workers, and the
further damage it inflicts on child witnesses. Although there are now
stricter domestic violence laws prompted by greater awareness of
domestic abuse, these laws are not reliably enforced in traditional
courts, and victims and offenders are not efficiently directed to
services. Therapeutic domestic violence courts appear to be an
efficient approach to address these problems. They seem likely to
reduce transaction costs by increasing coordination of services. Such
courts also appear to be a promising vehicle for reducing the high cost
of incarceration. Finally, to the extent that they are effective in
monitoring and compelling compliance with treatment requirements,
therapeutic domestic violence courts are a means to reduce recidivism
and future violence.
119. Id. at 1043-44.
120. See generally Tauchen et al., supra note 15.
121. Id. at 11. It is disquieting to note that this also means that the probability that the
relationship remains intact and that the batterer will bear the costs of inflicting violence falls and
this fact drives up the optimal level of violence. This study seems to succinctly demonstrate that
helping domestic violence victims leave relationships is productive if they are successful and
hence freed from violence, but is also dangerous because batterers have less to lose and may
become more violent when victims seek or have the means to flee.
122. For example, it appears that the existence of immediately available housing
alternatives to battered victims provides protection and reduced violence because they have the
ability promptly to avoid threatened violence. See id. at 22.
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